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Charter schools were developed, in part, to serve as an R&D engine for traditional public schools,
resulting in a wide variety of school strategies and outcomes. In this paper, we collect unparalleled
data on the inner-workings of 35 charter schools and correlate these data with credible estimates of
each school's effectiveness. We find that traditionally collected input measures -- class size, per pupil
expenditure, the fraction of teachers with no certification, and the fraction of teachers with an advanced
degree -- are not correlated with school effectiveness. In stark contrast, we show that an index of five
policies suggested by over forty years of qualitative research -- frequent teacher feedback, the use
of data to guide instruction, high-dosage tutoring, increased instructional time, and high expectations
-- explains approximately 50 percent of the variation in school effectiveness. Our results are robust
to controls for three alternative theories of schooling: a model emphasizing the provision of wrap-around
services, a model focused on teacher selection and retention, and the "No Excuses'' model of education.
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Improving the eﬃciency of public education in America is of great importance. The United States
spends $10,768 per pupil on primary and secondary education, ranking it fourth among OECD
countries (Aud et al. 2011). Yet, among these same countries, American ﬁfteen year-olds rank
twenty-ﬁfth in math achievement, seventeenth in science, and twelfth in reading (Fleischman 2010).
Traditionally, there have been two approaches to increasing educational eﬃciency: (1) expand the
scope of available educational options in the hope that the market will drive out ineﬀective schools,
or (2) directly manipulate inputs to the educational production function.
Evidence on the eﬃcacy of both approaches is mixed. Market-based reforms such as school choice
or school vouchers have, at best, a modest impact on student achievement (Rouse 1998, Ladd 2002,
Krueger and Zhu 2004, Cullen, Jacob, Levitt 2005, 2006, Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006, Wolf et
al. 2010, Belﬁeld and Levin 2002, Hsieh and Urquiola 2006, Card, Dooley, and Payne 2010, Winters
forthcoming). This suggests that competition alone is unlikely to signiﬁcantly increase the eﬃciency
of the public school system.
Similarly, eﬀorts to manipulate key educational inputs have been hampered by an inability to
identify school inputs that predict student achievement (Hanushek 1997).1 This is due, at least in
part, to a paucity of detailed data on the strategies and operations of schools, little variability in
potentially important inputs (e.g. instructional time), and the use of non-causal estimates of school
eﬀectiveness. For instance, the vast majority of quantitative analyses only account for inputs such
as class size, per pupil expenditure, or the fraction of teachers with an advanced degree. Measures of
teacher development, data driven instruction, school culture, and student expectations have never
been collected systematically, despite decades of qualitative research suggesting their importance
(see reviews in Edmunds 1979, 1982).
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the determinants of school eﬀectiveness by collecting
unparalleled data on the inner-workings of 35 charter schools in New York City and correlating
these data with credible estimates of each school’s eﬀectiveness. An enormous amount of infor-
mation was collected from each school. A principal interview asked about teacher development,
instructional time, data driven instruction, parent outreach, and school culture. Teacher interviews
asked about professional development, school policies, school culture, and student assessment. Stu-
1Krueger (2003) argues that resources are systematically related to student achievement when the studies in
Hanushek (1997) are given equal weight. It is only when each estimate is counted separately, as in Hanushek (1997),
that the relationship between resources and achievement is not signiﬁcant.
1dent interviews asked about school environment, school disciplinary policy, and future aspirations.
Lesson plans were used to measure curricular rigor. Videotaped classroom observations were used
to calculate the fraction of students on task throughout the school day.
Schools in our sample employ a wide variety of educational strategies and philosophies, providing
dramatic variability in school inputs. For instance, the Bronx Charter School for the Arts believes
that participation in the arts is a catalyst for academic and social success. The school integrates
art into almost every aspect of the classroom, prompting students to use art as a language to
express their thoughts and ideas. At the other end of the spectrum are a number of so-called “No
Excuses” schools, such as KIPP Inﬁnity, the HCZ Promise Academies, and the Democracy Prep
Charter School. These “No Excuses” schools emphasize frequent testing, dramatically increased
instructional time, parental pledges of involvement, aggressive human capital strategies, a “broken
windows” theory of discipline, and a relentless focus on math and reading achievement (Carter 2000,
Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2004, Whitman 2008). This variability, combined with rich measures
of school inputs and credible estimates of each school’s impact on student achievement, provides an
ideal opportunity to understand which inputs best explain school eﬀectiveness.
Our new data are interesting and informative. Input measures associated with a traditional
resource-based model of education – class size, per pupil expenditure, the fraction of teachers with
no teaching certiﬁcation, and the fraction of teachers with an advanced degree – are not correlated
with school eﬀectiveness in our sample. Indeed, our data suggest that increasing resource-based
inputs may actually lower school eﬀectiveness. Schools with more certiﬁed teachers have annual
math gains that are 0.043 (0.022) standard deviations lower than other schools. Schools with more
teachers with a masters degree have annual ELA gains that are 0.034 (0.019) standard deviations
lower. An index of class size, per pupil expenditure, the fraction of teachers with no teaching
certiﬁcation, and the fraction of teachers with an advanced degree, explains about 15 percent of the
variance in charter school eﬀectiveness, but in the unexpected direction.
In stark contrast, an index of ﬁve policies suggested by forty years of qualitative case-studies
– frequent teacher feedback, data driven instruction, high-dosage tutoring, increased instructional
time, and a relentless focus on academic achievement – explains roughly half of the variation in school
eﬀectiveness. A one standard deviation () increase in the index is associated with a 0.056 (0.011)
increase in annual math gains and a 0.039 (0.010) increase in annual ELA gains. Moreover, four out
of the ﬁve school policies in our index make a statistically signiﬁcant contribution controlling for an
index of the other four, suggesting that each policy conveys some relevant information. Controlling
2for the other four inputs, schools that give formal or informal feedback ten or more times per
semester have annual math gains that are 0.038 (0.022) higher and annual ELA gains that are
0.028 (0.015) higher than other schools. Schools that tutor students at least four days a week in
groups of six or less have annual math gains that are 0.044 (0.026) higher than other schools, and
ELA gains that are 0.064 (0.021) higher. Schools that add 25 percent or more instructional time
have annual gains that are 0.059 (0.015) higher in math.
We conclude our analysis by exploring the robustness of our results across three dimensions.
First, we demonstrate that the main results are unchanged when accounting for three alternative
theories of schooling: a model emphasizing the social and emotional needs of the “whole child”
through wrap-around services and parental engagement, a model focused solely on the selection and
retention of teacher talent, and the so-called “No Excuses” model of education. Second, we show
that the results are unaﬀected if we control for an index of 37 other control variables collected for
the purposes of this research. Third, we show that our main results are qualitatively similar in a
larger sample of charter schools in NYC, using more coarse administrative data from site visits,
state accountability reports, and school websites.
Our analysis has three important caveats. First, our estimates of the relationship between school
inputs and school eﬀectiveness are unlikely to be causal given the lack of experimental variation
in school inputs. Unobserved factors such as principal skill, student selection into lotteries, or
the endogeneity of school inputs could drive the correlations reported in the paper. Second, our
estimates come from a subset of charter schools in New York City. Although participating schools
are similar to other urban charter schools, they could diﬀer in important ways that limit our ability
to generalize our results. Moreover, there may be inputs common to almost all of the schools in
our sample (e.g. a non-unionized staﬀ) that have important interactions with other inputs. An
important next step is to inject the strategies identiﬁed here into a set of traditional public schools
(see Fryer 2011 for preliminary evidence from Houston). Third, while our data are remarkably
rich, we cannot test every dimension of the alternative theories of education described above. For
instance, advocates of the “whole child” approach will (correctly) argue that our data provide only
a partial test of what is inevitably a rich, complex, and interlocking theoretical construct.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature examining
ways to increase school eﬀectiveness. Section 3 describes the data collected for our analysis. Section
4 details our empirical strategy to estimate a school’s eﬀectiveness and reports treatment eﬀects for
our sample of charter schools. Section 5 provides a series of partial correlations of school inputs
3and school eﬀectiveness. Section 6 concludes. There are three online appendices. Online Appendix
A describes our sample and variable construction. Online Appendix B outlines our data collection
process. Online Appendix C provides information on the lottery data from each charter school.
2 A Brief Review of the Literature
There is a large literature investigating ways to increase educational eﬃciency. We divide the
literature into three parts: (1) evaluations of market based mechanisms such as school choice and
school vouchers, (2) quantitative attempts to link school inputs to student performance, and (3)
qualitative analyses of the strategies embedded in eﬀective schools. We brieﬂy describe each of these
literatures in turn.
A. Market Based Reforms
Early research estimating the impact of school competition on school eﬃciency exploits variation
in private school enrollment as a proxy for competitive pressure. Couch et al. (1993) ﬁnds a positive
relationship between district-wide average test scores at public schools and the fraction of local stu-
dents in private schools, which he interprets as evidence of a competition eﬀect. Subsequent studies
using the same approach on diﬀerent data ﬁnd smaller and generally insigniﬁcant eﬀects (New-
mark 1995, Sander 1999, Geller et al. 2006). Hoxby (1994) argues that private school enrollment
endogenously responds to the quality of local public schools. Using the fraction of Catholics in a
metropolitan area as an instrument for private enrollment, Hoxby (1994) reports that a ten percent
increase in the fraction of a county enrolled in Catholic schools increases educational attainment by
0.33 years and wages by two percent. Conversely, Winters (forthcoming) ﬁnds that schools losing
more students to charter schools are largely unaﬀected by the competitive pressures of the charter
option.
A second and related group of studies examines the impact of Tiebout competition between
public school districts. Borland and Howsen (1992) use the Herﬁndahl index of enrollment shares
at diﬀerent school districts as a measure of Tiebout competition, ﬁnding a slightly negative eﬀect of
competition on test scores. Arguing that district fragmentation is endogenous, Hoxby (2000) uses
the number of rivers and streams in a metropolitan area as an instrument for the Herﬁndahl index.
While Hoxby (2000) reports a positive impact of competition on student achievement, Rothstein
(2006b) ﬁnds no eﬀect of district fragmentation on the degree of sorting between school districts,
suggesting that inter-district competition eﬀects are small.
4A third strand of the literature examines the impact of private school vouchers on public school
eﬃciency. Consistent with theoretical analyses by Epple and Romano (1998) and Nechyba (2000),
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) ﬁnd that the expansion of private school vouchers in Chile led to increased
stratiﬁcation across schools, with few gains in student outcomes. Hoxby (2003), Carnoy et al.
(2007), and Chakrabarti (2008) use the expansion of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program to
estimate the impact of school vouchers on school eﬃciency in non-voucher schools, ﬁnding evidence
that student performance improved in the ﬁrst few years of the expansion. However, Carnoy et al.
(2007) ﬁnd few gains at non-voucher schools after the initial voucher expansion.2
B. School Inputs
An immense literature relating school inputs to student achievement has developed in the wake
of the Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966). In a meta-analysis of close to 400 studies, Hanushek
(1997) ﬁnds that there is little evidence of a relationship between student performance and school
resources after family background is taken into account. However, Krueger (2003) argues that
resources are systematically related to student achievement when the studies in Hanushek (1997)
are given equal weight. It is only when each estimate is counted separately, as in Hanushek (1997),
that the relationship between resources and achievement is not signiﬁcant.
Two recent papers attempt to link charter school characteristics and student achievement gains.
Using data from 32 charter schools in NYC, Hoxby and Muraka (2009) ﬁnd that an additional ten
instructional days is associated with a 0.2 increase in annual achievement gains. Angrist, Pathak,
and Walters (2011) use data from 30 charter schools in Massachusetts to show that urban charter
schools are more eﬀective at raising test scores than non-urban charter schools. Like many others,
they argue that adherence to the so-called “No Excuses” paradigm can account for the nearly all of
the urban advantage (Carter 2000, Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2004). Both Hoxby and Muraka
(2009) and Angrist, Pathak, and Walters (2011) lack the kind of detailed within the school data
used in this paper.
C. Case-Studies of Effective Schools
2An emerging literature uses randomized admission lotteries to estimate the impact of exercising the school choice
option. Peterson et al. (1998) and Howell and Peterson (2002) ﬁnd that attending a private school modestly increases
student achievement for low-achieving African-American students in New York City, Dayton, and Washington, DC.
A reanalysis of the New York City experiment by Krueger and Zhu (2004), however, suggests little impact of receiving
a school voucher. Cullen et al. (2006), using randomized admission lotteries to magnet high schools in Chicago, ﬁnd
little impact of attending a better high school on academic achievement. Similarly, Hastings et al. (2006) ﬁnd little
impact of attending a “ﬁrst-choice” school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg on achievement, though Deming (forthcoming)
and Deming et al. (2011) ﬁnd a positive impact on crime and college attendance.
5Qualitative researchers have amassed a large literature exploring the attributes of eﬀective
schools. In 1974, New York’s Oﬃce of Education Performance Review analyzed two NYC pub-
lic schools serving disadvantaged students, one highly eﬀective, one not. The study concluded that
diﬀerences in academic achievement were driven by diﬀerences in principal skill, expectations for
students, and classroom instruction. Madden, Lawson and Sweet (1976) examined 21 pairs of Cal-
ifornia elementary schools matched on pupil characteristics, but diﬀering in student achievement.
The more eﬀective schools were more likely to provide teacher feedback, tutor their students, mon-
itor student performance, and have classroom cultures more conducive to learning. Brookover and
Lezotte (1977) found similar results for a set of schools in Michigan. Summarizing the literature,
Edmonds (1979) argued that eﬀective schools tend to have a strong administrative leadership, high
expectations for all children regardless of background, an atmosphere conducive to learning, a focus
on academic achievement, and frequent monitoring of student progress.
A more recent branch of this literature focuses on the characteristics of so-called “No Excuses”
schools, loosely deﬁned as schools that emphasize strict discipline, extended time in school, and
an intensive focus on building basic reading and math skills. Using observations from 21 high
poverty high performing schools, Carter (2000) argues that “No Excuses” schools succeed due to
empowered principals, the use of interim assessments to measure student progress, frequent and
eﬀective professional development, aggressive parent outreach, and a relentless focus on achievement
for all students regardless of background. Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2004) similarly argue that
“No Excuses” schools are more eﬀective due to more instructional time, a zero tolerance disciplinary
code, high academic expectations for all students, and an emphasis on teaching basic math and
reading skills (see Whitman 2008 for similar arguments).
3 Constructing a Database on the Inner-Workings of Schools
The main data for this paper are gathered from two sources: (1) school speciﬁc data collected from
principal, teacher, and student surveys, lesson plans, and videotaped observations of classroom
lessons, and (2) administrative data on student demographics and outcomes from the New York
City Department of Education (NYCDOE). Below, we describe each data source.
63.1 School Characteristics Data
In the spring of 2010, we attempted to collect survey, lottery, and video data for all charter schools
in New York City with students in grades 3 - 8. Eligible schools were invited to participate via
email and phone. We also hosted an informational event at the New York Charter Center to explain
the project to interested schools. Schools were oﬀered a $5000 stipend to be received conditional
on providing all of the appropriate materials. Of the 48 eligible charter elementary schools (entry
grades K - 4) and 37 eligible charter middle schools (entry grades 5 - 8), 22 elementary schools
and 13 middle schools chose to participate in the study. Within the set of participating schools,
13 elementary schools and 9 middle schools also provided admissions lottery data. The other 13
schools were either under-subscribed or did not keep usable lottery records. Table 1 summarizes
the selection process. Appendix Table 1 lists each participating school, along with the data that is
available for each school.
An enormous amount of information was collected from participating schools. A principal inter-
view asked about teacher and staﬀ development, instructional time, data driven instruction, parent
outreach, and school culture. An hour long follow up phone interview with each school leader pro-
vided additional details on each domain. Information on curricular rigor was coded from lesson plans
collected for each testable grade level in both math and ELA. Finally, information on school culture
and practices was gathered during full day visits to each school. These visits included videotaped
classroom observations of at least one math and reading class and interviews with randomly chosen
teachers and students. Below we describe the variables we code from this data. Additional details
on the data are available in Online Appendix A. Full survey and interview scripts are available in
Online Appendix B.
A. Human Capital
A school’s human capital policies are captured through the number of times a teacher receives
formal or informal feedback from classroom visits, how many hours teachers spend on instructional
and non-instructional activities during a normal week, the highest teacher salary at the school, the
fraction of teachers who leave involuntarily each year, and the number of non-negotiables a school
has when hiring a new teacher. See Online Appendix B for further details.
Summary statistics for our human capital data are displayed in Table 2. We split our sample
into more and less eﬀective schools based on estimates described in Section 4. Speciﬁcally, we
separate the sample at the median using the average of each school’s estimated impact on math
7and ELA scores. Consistent with Edmonds (1979, 1982), high achieving schools have more intensive
human capital policies than other schools. The typical teacher at a high achieving elementary school
receives feedback 16.41 times per semester, compared to 11.31 times at other charter schools. The
typical teacher at a high achieving middle school receives feedback 13.42 times per semester, 6.35
more instances of feedback than teachers at other charter schools. Teachers at high achieving schools
also work longer hours than teachers at other charter schools; an additional 7.75 hours per week
at the elementary level and 10.29 hours per week at the middle school level. Despite this higher
workload, the maximum salary of teachers at high achieving schools is the same or somewhat lower
than other charter schools.
B. The Use of Data in Instructional Practice
We attempt to understand how schools use data through the frequency of interim assessments,
whether teachers meet with a school leader to discuss student data, how often teachers receive
reports on student results, and how often data from interim assessments are used to adjust tutoring
groups, assign remediation, modify instruction, or create individualized student goals.
Summary statistics for our data driven instruction variables are displayed in Table 2. High
achieving schools use data more intensely than other charter schools in our sample. High achieving
elementary schools test students 3.92 times per semester, compared to 2.42 times at other charter
schools. Higher achieving middle schools test students 4.00 times, compared to 2.04 times at other
charter middle schools in our sample. Higher achieving schools are also more likely to track students
using data and utilize more diﬀerentiation strategies compared to low achieving schools.
C. Parental Engagement
Parent outreach variables capture how often schools communicate with parents due to academic
performance, due to behavioral issues, or to simply provide feedback.
Summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that high achieving elementary and middle schools provide
more feedback of all types to parents. Higher achieving schools provide academic feedback 3.00 more
times per semester than other schools, behavioral feedback 9.20 more times per semester, and general
feedback to parents 7.27 more times per semester.
D. High-Dosage Tutoring
Tutoring variables measure how often students are tutored and how large the groups are. We
code a school as oﬀering small group tutoring if the typical group is six or fewer students. Schools
8are coded as oﬀering frequent tutoring if groups typically meet four or more times per week. Finally,
schools are coded as having high-dosage tutoring if the typical group is six or fewer students and
those groups meet four or more times per week.
While almost all charter schools in our sample oﬀer some sort of tutoring, high achieving charter
schools in our sample are far more likely to oﬀer high-dosage tutoring. Thirty-three percent of high
achieving elementary schools oﬀer high-dosage tutoring compared to ten percent of low achieving
schools. Seventeen percent of high achieving middle schools oﬀer high-dosage tutoring, while none
of the low achieving schools do.
E. Instructional Time
Instructional time is measured through the length and number of instructional days and the
number of minutes spent on math and ELA in each school.
High achieving charter schools in our sample have a longer instructional year and day than other
charter schools. The typical high achieving elementary school has 190.67 instructional days and an
instructional day of 8.07 hours, compared to 183.80 instructional days and 7.36 instructional hours
at other charter schools. The typical high achieving middle school meets for 191.00 instructional
days, with a typical instructional day lasting 8.17 hours. Other charter middle schools in our sample
meet for only 187.14 instructional days with an average day of 7.87 hours. In other words, high
achieving elementary schools provide about 26.68 percent more instructional hours per year than a
typical NYC schools, while high achieving middle schools provide about 28.07 percent more. Other
charter schools, on the other hand, provide just 11.39 and 21.38 percent more instructional time at
the elementary and middle school levels respectively.3
F. Culture and Expectations
School culture is measured through two sets of questions. The ﬁrst set of questions asks leaders
to rank ten school priorities. We code a school as having high academic and behavioral expectations
if an administrator ranks “a relentless focus on academic goals and having students meet them” and
“very high expectations for student behavior and discipline” as her top two priorities (in either
order). Other potential priorities include “a comprehensive approach to the social and emotional
needs of the whole child,” “building a student’s self-esteem through positive reinforcement,” and
“prioritizing each child’s interests and passions in designing a project-based unit.”
3Traditional public schools in NYC meet for 180 instructional days and 6.0 to 7.5 instructional hours each day.
We assume a 6.75 hour instructional day when calculating changes in instructional time.
9The second set of culture questions consists of ten multiple choice questions written for the
purposes of this study by the founder of the MATCH charter high school in Boston, a prominent
“No Excuses” adherent. The questions ask about whether rules are school-wide or classroom speciﬁc,
how students learn school culture, whether students wait for the teacher to dismiss the class, desk
and backpack rules, hallway order, classroom activities, and whether students track teachers with
their eyes. We create a dichotomous variable for each question equal to one if a school leader
indicates a “No Excuses,” or more strict, disciplinary policy. Our measure of a school’s disciplinary
policy is the standardized sum of the ten dichotomous variables.
Consistent with past research (e.g. Edmunds 1979, 1982, Carter 2000, Thernstrom and Thern-
strom 2004), high achieving charter schools are more likely to have higher academic and behavioral
expectations compared to other charter schools and are more likely to have school-wide disciplinary
policies.
G. Lesson Plans
The rigor of a school’s curriculum is coded from lesson plans collected from each testable grade
level and subject area in a school. We code whether the most advanced objective for each lesson
is at or above grade level using New York State standards for the associated subject and grade.
Lesson plan complexity is coded using the cognitive domain of Bloom’s taxonomy which indicates
the level of higher-order thinking required to complete the objective. In the case where a lesson
has more than one objective, the most complex objective was chosen. We also code the number of
diﬀerentiation strategies present in each lesson plan and the number of checks for understanding.
Finally, we create an aggregate thoroughness measure that captures whether a lesson plan includes
an objective, an essential question, a do-now, key words section, materials section, introduction
section, main learning activity, a check for understanding, an assessment, a closing activity, time
needed for each section, homework section, teacher reﬂection section, and if the lesson plan follows
a standardized format. The inclusion of each element increases the thoroughness measure by one,
which is then standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Surprisingly, lesson plans at high achieving charter schools are not more likely to be at or above
grade level and do not have higher Bloom’s Taxonomy Scores. Higher achieving charter schools also
appear no more likely to have more diﬀerentiated lesson plans and appear to have less thorough
lesson plans than lower achieving charter schools. Above median elementary schools have an average
of 4.67 items on our lesson plan thoroughness measure, while lower achieving scores have 5.12. The
10gap between above and below median middle schools is even larger, with above median schools
having 5.50 items and below median schools averaging 6.83 items.
3.2 Administrative Data
Our second data source consists of administrative data on student demographics and outcomes from
the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE). The data include information on student
race, gender, free and reduced-price lunch eligibility, behavior, attendance, and state math and ELA
test scores for students in grades three through eight. The NYCDOE data span the 2003 - 2004 to
2009 - 2010 school years.
The state math and ELA tests, developed by McGraw-Hill, are high-stakes exams conducted
in the spring semester of third through eighth grade. The math test includes questions on number
sense and operations, algebra, geometry, measurement, and statistics. Tests in the earlier grades
emphasize more basic content such as number sense and operations, while later tests focus on
advanced topics such as algebra and geometry. The ELA test is designed to assess students on
their information and understanding, literary response and expression, and critical analysis and
evaluation. The ELA test includes multiple-choice and short-response sections based on a reading
and listening section, as well as a brief editing task.
All public-school students, including those attending charters, are required to take the math and
ELA tests unless they are medically excused or have a severe disability. Students with moderate
disabilities or who are English Language Learners must take both tests, but may be granted special
accommodations (additional time, translation services, and so on) at the discretion of school or
state administrators. In our analysis the test scores are normalized to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one for each grade and year across the entire New York City sample.
Student level summary statistics for the variables that we use in our core speciﬁcations are
displayed in Table 3. Charter students are more likely to be black and less likely to be English
language learners or participate in special education compared to the typical NYC student. Charter
students receive free or reduced price lunch at similar rates as other NYC students. Charter middle
school students score 0.08 lower in ﬁfth grade math and 0.06 lower in ﬁfth grade ELA compared
to the typical NYC student. Students in our sample of charter schools score 0.12 lower in math
and 0.08 lower in ELA compared to the typical charter student in NYC, suggesting that schools
in our sample are negatively selected (on test score levels) from the NYC charter school population
as a whole.
114 The Impact of Attending a NYC Charter School
To estimate the causal impact of each school in our sample, we use two empirical models. The
ﬁrst exploits the fact that oversubscribed charter schools in NYC are required to admit students
via random lottery. The second statistical model uses a combination of matching and regression
analysis to partially control for selection into charter schools.
Following Hoxby and Muraka (2009), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), and Dobbie and Fryer (2011),
we model the eﬀect of a charter school on student achievement as a linear function of the number
of years spent at the school:
achievementigt = t + g + Xi + Charterigt + "igt (1)
where t and g and year and grade of test eﬀects respectively, Xi is a vector of demographic
controls including gender, race, free lunch status, and baseline test scores. "igt is an error term that
captures random variation in test scores.
The causal eﬀect of attending a charter school is . If the number of years a student spends at a
charter was randomly assigned, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) would cap-
ture the average causal eﬀect of years spent at the school. Because students and parents selectively
choose whether to enroll at a charter school, however, OLS estimates are likely to be biased by cor-
relation between school choice and unobserved characteristics related to student ability, motivation,
or background.
To identify  we use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that exploits the fact that New York
law dictates that over-subscribed charter schools allocate enrollment oﬀers via a random lottery.
The ﬁrst stage equations for IV estimation take the form:
Charterigt = t + g + Xi + Zi +
X
j
jLotteryij + igt (2)
where  captures the eﬀect of the lottery oﬀer Zi on the number of years a student spends at a
charter school. The lottery indicators Lotteryij are lottery ﬁxed eﬀects for each of the school’s j
lotteries. We also control for whether the student had a sibling in a lottery that year. We estimate
the impact of each school separately within the pool of lottery applicants. We stack test scores and
cluster standard errors at the student level.
Our lottery sample is drawn from each lottery that took place between 2003 and 2009 at our
12sample schools. We make three sample restrictions. First, applicants with a sibling already at
a school are excluded, as they are automatically admitted. Second, applicants are dropped who,
because of within-district preference introduced in 2008, had either no chance of winning the lottery
or were automatically granted admission. Finally, we include only the ﬁrst application of students
who apply to a school more than once. These restrictions leave us with a sample of 9,850 lottery
students in 58 lotteries at 22 schools. Appendix C describes the lottery data from each school in
more detail.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 present summary statistics for lottery applicants in our lottery
sample. As a measure of lottery quality, Table 3 also tests for balance on baseline characteristics.
Speciﬁcally, we regress an indicator for winning the lottery on pretreatment characteristics and
lottery ﬁxed eﬀects. Elementary lottery winners are 0.03 percentage points less likely to be eligible
for free and reduced price lunch compared to Elementary lottery losers. Middle school lottery
winners are 0.01 percentage points less likely to be English language learners. There are no other
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between lottery winners and lottery losers. This suggests that the lottery is
balanced and that selection bias should not unduly aﬀect our lottery estimates.
An important caveat to our lottery analysis is that lottery admissions records are only available
for 22 of our 35 schools. To get an estimate of school eﬀectiveness for schools in our sample that
do not have valid lottery data or are not oversubscribed, our second empirical strategy computes
observational estimates. Following Angrist et. al (2011), we use a combination of matching and
regression estimators to control for observed diﬀerences between students attending diﬀerent types of
schools. First, we match students attending sample charters to a control sample of traditional public
school students using the school a student is originally zoned to, cohort, sex, race, limited English
proﬁciency status, and free and reduced price lunch eligibility. Charter students are included in the
observational estimates if they are matched to at least one regular public school student. Traditional
school students are included if they are matched to at least one charter student. This procedure
yields matches for 94.3 percent of students in charter schools in our sample.
Within the group of matched charter and traditional public school students, we estimate equation
(1) controlling for baseline test scores and ﬁxed eﬀects for the cells constructed in the matching
procedure. Speciﬁcally, the observational estimates were constructed by ﬁtting:
achievementigtc = t + g + c + 'Xi + sCharterigts + igts (3)
13where t and g and year and grade of test eﬀects respectively, Xi is a vector of demographic
controls including baseline test scores and years enrolled in charters not in our sample, c are match
cell ﬁxed eﬀects, and Charterigts is a vector of the number of years spent in each charter in our
sample. The observational estimates therefore compare demographically similar students zoned to
the same school and in the same age cohort, who spend diﬀerent amounts of time in charter schools.
We stack student observations for all schools in our sample, and cluster standard errors at the
student level.
Table 4 reports a series of results on the impact of attending charter schools on student achieve-
ment in our sample. We report reduced-form (column 1), ﬁrst stage (column 2), and instrumental
variable estimates from our lottery sample (column 3), a non-experimental estimate of our lottery
sample (column 4), and a non-experimental estimate that includes schools without oversubscribed
lotteries (column 5). We estimate eﬀects for elementary and middle schools separately. All regres-
sions control for grade and year eﬀects, gender, race, free lunch status, lottery cohort, and previous
test scores in the same subject.
Elementary school lottery winners outscore lottery losers by 0.119 (0.029) in math and 0.056
(0.027) in ELA. Middle school lottery winners outscore lottery losers by 0.064 (0.015) in math and
0.023 (0.014) in ELA. The lottery ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient is 0.755 (0.054) for elementary school, and
0.403 (0.024) for middle school. In other words, by the time they were tested, elementary school
lottery winners had spent an average of 0.755 more years at a charter school than lottery losers.
This ﬁrst stage is similar to lottery winners at other urban charter schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al.
2011, Angrist et al. 2010). The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate, which captures the causal
eﬀect of attending a charter school for one year, is 0.158 (0.038) in math and 0.074 (0.036) in
ELA for elementary schools, and 0.159 (0.037) in math and 0.057 (0.034) in ELA for middle
schools. The magnitude of these results is consistent with other work on “No Excuses” charter
schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, Angrist et al. 2010, Dobbie and Fryer 2011), but larger than
the average charter in New York (Hoxby and Muraka 2009). The larger estimates could be due to
an increase in school eﬀectiveness since the Hoxby and Muraka study, or positive selection into our
sample.
Column 4 of Table 4 presents observational results for our lottery charter schools. Our obser-
vational estimates imply that elementary charter students score 0.054 (0.004) higher in math for
each year they attend a charter school, and 0.050 (0.003) in ELA. Middle school charter students
gain 0.051 (0.004) in math and 0.013 (0.004) in ELA for each year they attend a charter. The
14observational are qualitatively similar to the lottery estimates, though smaller in magnitude. This
suggests that while matching and regression control for some of the selection into charter schools,
observational estimates are still downwards biased relative to the true impact of charter schools.
Observational estimates for the full sample of charters are somewhat lower compared to the lottery
sample.
Figure 1 plots lottery and observational estimates for the 22 schools in our lottery sample. Re-
gressing each school’s lottery estimate on that school’s observational estimate results in a coeﬃcient
of 0.768 (0.428) for math and 0.526 (0.597) for ELA, suggesting that our observational estimates
at least partially control for selection bias. With that said, Figure 1 also suggests that our ob-
servational estimates are biased downwards and have less variance than the corresponding lottery
estimates. For instance, the lottery estimates for math have a standard deviation of 0.251, while
the observational estimates have a standard deviation of 0.142. Estimates for ELA reveal a similar
pattern.
5 Getting Beneath the Veil of Eﬀective Schools
5.1 Main Results
In this section, we present a series of partial correlations between strategies and policies that describe
the inner workings of schools and each school’s eﬀectiveness at increasing student test scores. The
speciﬁcations estimated are of the form:
s = constant + 'MSs + #Ps + s (4)
where s is an estimate of the eﬀect of charter school s, MSs is an indicator for being a middle
school, and Ps is a vector of school policies and school characteristics measured in our survey and
video observations. The estimates of equation (4) are weighted by the inverse of the standard error
of the estimate treatment eﬀect s. Standard errors are clustered at the school level to account
for correlation between elementary and middle school campuses. Unless otherwise noted, we use
observational estimates of s, which increases our sample size from 22 to 35. Our main results are
qualitatively unchanged using lottery estimates, though the estimates are less precise (see Appendix
Tables 2 through 5).
The parameter of interest is #, which measures the partial correlation of a given school char-
15acteristic on eﬀectiveness. Recall, our estimates are not likely to be causal in nature. Unobserved
factors such as principal ability or parental involvement could drive the correlation between our
measures and school eﬀectiveness.
As mentioned in Section 2, there is a voluminous literature relating school inputs to average test
scores. The typical dataset includes variables such as class size, per pupil expenditure, and teacher
credentials. With the notable exception of a number of quasi-experimental studies ﬁnding a positive
impact of class size on test scores, previous research has found little evidence linking these inputs
to achievement (see reviews in Hanushek 1997 and Krueger 2003).
Table 5 presents results using several of the traditionally collected school inputs – class size, per
pupil expenditure, the fraction of teachers with no certiﬁcation, and the fraction of teachers with
a masters degree – as explanatory variables for school eﬀectiveness. For each measure we create
an indicator variable equal to one if a school is above the median in that measure. Consistent
with Hanushek (1997), we ﬁnd that these measures are either statistically unrelated to school
eﬀectiveness or are signiﬁcant in an unexpected direction. For instance, schools where at least 89
percent of teachers are certiﬁed have annual math gains that are 0.043 (0.022) lower. Schools
where at least eleven percent of teachers have a masters degree have annual ELA gains that are
0.034 (0.019) lower. An index of the four dichotomous measures explains 13.6 to 20.4 percent of
the variance in charter school eﬀectiveness but in the unexpected direction.4
In stark contrast, Table 6 demonstrates that the ﬁve policies suggested most often by the qual-
itative literature on successful schools (Edmunds 1979, 1982) – teacher feedback, the use of data to
guide instruction, tutoring, instructional time, and a culture of high expectations – explain around
50 percent of the variance in charter school outcomes. Schools that give formal or informal feedback
ten or more times per semester have annual math gains that are 0.075 (0.021) higher and annual
ELA gains that are 0.054 (0.017) higher than other schools. Schools that give ﬁve or more interim
assessments during the school year and that have four or more diﬀerentiation strategies have annual
math and ELA gains that are 0.078 (0.036) and 0.045 (0.029) higher, respectively. Schools that
tutor students at least four days a week in groups of six or fewer have 0.069 (0.033) higher math
scores and 0.078 (0.025) higher ELA scores. Schools that add 25 percent or more instructional time
4One concern is that charter schools do not use resource-based inputs at the same rate as traditional public
schools. This does not appear to be the case, though its possible. According to the NYCDOE, for example, charter
elementary schools have class sizes that range from 18 to 26 students per class and charter middle schools have class
sizes ranging from 22 to 29 students. In 2010 - 2011, the average class size in a traditional elementary school in NYC
was 23.7 students and the average class size in a traditional middle school was 26.6 to 27.1 students, depending on
the subject.
16compared to traditional public schools have annual gains that are 0.084 (0.022) higher in math
and 0.043 (0.024) higher in ELA. Whether or not a school prioritizes high academic and behavioral
expectations for all students is associated with math gains that are 0.066 (0.028) higher than other
schools and ELA gains that are 0.049 (0.019) higher per year. A one standard deviation increase
in an index of all ﬁve dichotomous variables is associated with a 0.056 (0.011) increase in annual
math gains and a 0.039 (0.010) increase in annual ELA gains.5
Table 7 estimates the partial correlation of each of the ﬁve policies on school eﬀectiveness, con-
trolling for the other four. Surprisingly, four out of the ﬁve policy measures used in our index
continue to be statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that each policy conveys some relevant informa-
tion. Controlling for other school policies, schools that give formal or informal feedback ten or more
times per semester have annual math gains that are 0.038 (0.022) higher and annual ELA gains
that are 0.028 (0.015) higher than other schools. Schools that give ﬁve or more interim assessments
during the school year and that have four or more diﬀerentiation strategies have annual math and
ELA gains that are 0.051 (0.022) higher. The lack of signiﬁcance in ELA is intuitive, as it is less
clear how to use data to inform reading instruction relative to math. Schools that add 25 percent
or more instructional time compared to traditional public schools have annual gains that are 0.059
(0.015) higher in math, though not in ELA. Controlling for other policies, schools that prioritize
high-dosage tutoring have annual math gains that are 0.044 (0.026) higher than other schools and
ELA gains that are 0.064 (0.021) higher.
5.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we explore the robustness of our results by accounting for a more diverse set of
controls and performing an out of sample test of our main index.
A. Three Alternative Models of School Effectiveness
Our ﬁrst robustness test attempts to account for three alternative models of eﬀective schooling
put forth in the literature. The ﬁrst model we test emphasizes the importance of taking into account
the social and emotional needs of the “whole child” through wrap-around services. Advocates of
5While the index variable is associated with large and statistically signiﬁcant gains in the lottery sample, the
measure only explains 18.4 percent of the variance in math eﬀectiveness and 8.8 percent of the variation in ELA
eﬀectiveness in the lottery sample. The relatively low R
2 is most likely due to the imprecision of the lottery estimates
of school eﬀectiveness; only 7 of the 22 schools have statistically signiﬁcant results in either subject when using our
lottery estimation strategy. The reduction in sample size from 35 to 22 schools itself does not appear important,
however. The index measure explains over 50 percent of the variation in both math and ELA eﬀectiveness among
the 22 lottery schools when using observational measures of eﬀectiveness.
17this approach argue that teachers and school administrators are dealing with issues that originate
outside the classroom, citing research that shows racial and socioeconomic achievement gaps are
formed before children ever enter school (Fryer and Levitt 2004, 2006) and that one-third to one-half
of the gap can be explained by family-environment indicators (Phillips et al. 1998, Fryer and Levitt
2004). In this scenario, combating poverty and having wrap-around services that address some of
the social and emotional needs of students may lead to more focused instruction in school. In a
meta-analysis, Payton et al. (2008) estimate that school-wide social-emotional learning programs
increase achievement by 0.28, that programs that target at-risk individuals increase achievement
by 0.43, and that after school programs raise achievement by 0.08.
To partially test this theory, we create a set of indicator variables equal to one if a school has a
school social worker, provides health services, provides any wrap-around services, and if they rank
“a comprehensive approach to the social and emotional needs of the whole child,” as one of their
top two school priorities. Our index of wrap-around services is the standardized sum of these four
dichotomous variables. The ﬁrst two columns in panels A and B of Table 8 present the correlation
between wrap-around services and school eﬀectiveness with and without controlling for our main
index.
A one standard deviation increase in wrap-around services is associated with a 0.025 (0.014)
decrease in annual math gains and a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.018 (0.012) decrease in annual
ELA gains. Consistent with the ﬁndings in Dobbie and Fryer (2011), there is not a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between providing a comprehensive approach to the “whole child” through
wrap-around services that we are able to measure and school eﬀectiveness after controlling for our
main index. Perhaps more importantly, the coeﬃcient on our main index after controlling for
wrap-around service provision is statistically indistinguishable from the speciﬁcation without these
controls. As discussed in the Introduction, however, our data provide only a partial test of the
“whole child” model of schooling.
The second model we account for emphasizes the selection and retention of talented teachers.
Teacher quality is believed to be one of the most important inputs into the educational production
function. A one standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises math achievement by 0.15
to 0.24 per year and reading achievement by 0.15 to 0.20 per year (Rockoﬀ 2004, Rivkin, Kain,
and Hanushek 2005, Aaronson et al. 2007, Kane and Staiger 2008). The diﬃculty, however, is
extremely diﬃcult to identify ex ante the most productive teachers (see reviews in Hanushek 1986,
1997). As a result, many have argued that in addition to selecting better teachers, schools must
18remove ineﬀective teachers, and introduce pay-for-performance schemes in order to retain more
eﬀective teachers. For example, Hanushek (2009) argues that eliminating the worst six to ten
percent of teachers would increase student achievement by about 0.5.
To test this hypothesis, we create a set of indicator variables equal to one if a school has an
above median number of requirements when hiring a new teacher, if the school has above median
involuntary turnover, if the school has an above median maximum salary, and if the school oﬀers
performance pay to teachers. Our index of teacher selection, retention, and pay, is the standardized
sum of these four dichotomous variables.
The second two columns in panels A and B of Table 8 present results for these teacher selection
strategies. Interestingly, higher values of our teacher index are associated with school eﬀectiveness
in math, but not ELA.6 The policy index suggested by the qualitative case-study literature is
statistically identical whether or not we control for the index of teacher selection, retention, and
pay.
The third model we test is whether the adherence to a “No Excuses” philosophy drives school
success. As discussed by Carter (2000), Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2004), Whitman (2008), and
others, “No Excuses” schools emphasize strict discipline, extended time in school, and an intensive
focus on basic reading and math skills. Angrist et. al (2011) argue that adherence to the “No
Excuses” philosophy explains the diﬀerence between the eﬀectiveness of urban and non-urban charter
schools in Massachusetts.
Similar to Angrist et al (2011), we create an indicator variable for whether a school is considered
a follower of the “No Excuses” model of schooling. Consistent with previous research, Columns 5
and 13 of Table 8 demonstrate a strong correlation between being identiﬁed as a “No Excuses” school
and school eﬀectiveness (Monroe 1999, Carter 2000, Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2004, Angrist et
al. 2011). Students at “No Excuses” schools gain 0.065 (0.029) more in math than students at
other charter schools and a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.034 (0.020) more in ELA. Interestingly,
however, after controlling for the the ﬁve factors in our main index, “No Excuses” schools do no
better or worse than other charter schools.
The fact that the “No Excuses” designation becomes statistically insigniﬁcant when one accounts
for ﬁve policies is striking and highly suggestive that their is nothing mystical about “No Excuses”
schools. More time, more eﬀective teachers, the use of data and high-dosage tutoring, and high
6Appendix Table 4 demonstrates some fragility in these results. The index of teacher selection, retention, and
pay has the opposite sign and is marginally signiﬁcant in our lottery sample.
19expectations seem to be more important predictors of school eﬀectiveness, regardless of a school’s
overarching philosophy (e.g. “No Excuses,” Montessori, or arts infused).
B. Accounting for More Controls
Our second robustness check simply accounts for every other measure of school inputs collected
during the study that does not enter the main index. This control index is created by standardizing
the sum of six indexes – human capital policies, data policies, parent engagement strategies, in-
structional time diﬀerences, culture and expectations, and curricular rigor – to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. In total, the index captures variation in 37 measures, virtually all
of the data we collected in the principal survey.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 8 present results controlling for the aggregate index of 37 vari-
ables. A one standard deviation increase in this aggregate index is associated with a 0.024 (0.014)
increase in annual math gains, and a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.011 (0.007) increase in annual
ELA gains. However, the control index is statistically indistinguishable from zero after controlling
our main index. The coeﬃcient on the main index is again statistically indistinguishable from the
speciﬁcation with no controls, which suggests the other variables collected do not convey any more
statistically relevant information in explaining charter school success.
C. An Out of Sample Test
Our ﬁnal robustness check explores the association between the school inputs in our main index
and school eﬀectiveness in a set of schools that did not participate in our survey. To do this, we col-
lected similar (though more coarse) administrative data on human capital, data driven instruction,
instructional time, and culture for every possible charter school in New York City. Despite an ex-
haustive search, we could not ﬁnd any administrative data on whether or how these schools tutored
students. Thus, our index for this out of sample test will contain four out of the ﬁve variables.
Our data is drawn primarily from annual site visit reports provided by each school’s chartering
organization. New York City charter schools are either authorized by the New York City Depart-
ment of Education (NYCDOE), the State University of New York (SUNY), or the New York State
Department of Education (NYSDOE). The site visits are meant to “describe what the reviewers
saw at the school - what life is like there” (NYCDOE 2011). The report identiﬁes some of the
strengths in a school, as well as areas where improvement is needed.7 Thirty-one NYCDOE and
7Site visit reports chartered by the NYCDOE include quantitative rankings, from which we draw our measures.
SUNY site visit reports are qualitative in nature. In the latter case, we code each variable directly from the text of
the site visit report.
20twenty-ﬁve SUNY schools have both site visit reports and students in grades 3 - 8. For this set
of schools, we complement the site visit data with data from New York State Accountability and
Overview Reports, the Charter School Center, and each school’s website. More information on each
data source and how we construct our variables to most closely match the variables collected in our
survey is available in Online Appendix A.
Table 9 presents results using all eligible charter schools chartered with site visit data. The
results of our out of sample test are similar to, though less precise than, the survey results. A
one standard deviation increase in the case-study index is associated with a 0.025 (0.010) increase
in math scores and a 0.011 (0.006) increase in ELA scores. However, the index explains less
than seven percent of the variation in math and ELA, likely reﬂecting measurement error in the
data. Instructional time and high academic and behavioral expectations are signiﬁcantly related to
achievement. The point estimates on teacher observations and data driven instruction are positive
but not statistically signiﬁcant.
6 Conclusion
Charter schools were created to (1) serve as an escape hatch for students in failing schools and (2)
use their relative freedom to incubate best practices to be infused into traditional public schools.
Consistent with the second mission, charter schools employ a wide variety of educational strategies
and operations, providing dramatic variability in school inputs. Taking advantage of this fact, we
collect unparalleled data on the inner-workings of 35 charter schools in New York City to understand
what inputs are most correlated with school eﬀectiveness. Our data include a wealth of information
collected from each school through principal, teacher, and student surveys, sample teacher evaluation
forms, lesson plans, homework, and video observations.
We show that input measures associated with a traditional resource-based model of education
– class size, per pupil expenditure, the fraction of teachers with no teaching certiﬁcation, and the
fraction of teachers with an advanced degree – are not positively correlated with school eﬀectiveness.
In stark contrast, an index of ﬁve policies suggested by forty years of qualitative research – frequent
teacher feedback, data driven instruction, high-dosage tutoring, increased instructional time, and a
relentless focus on academic achievement – explains almost half of the variation in school eﬀective-
ness. Moreover, we show that these variables continue to be statistically important after accounting
for alternative models of schooling, and a host of other explanatory variables, and are predictive in
21a diﬀerent sample of schools.
While there are important caveats to the conclusion that these ﬁve policies can explain signiﬁcant
variation in school eﬀectiveness, our results suggest a model of schooling that may have general
application. The key next step is to inject these strategies into traditional public schools and assess
whether they have a causal eﬀect on student achievement.
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28Table 1
School Participation
All Eligible Survey Lottery
Charters Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elementary 68 48 22 13
Middle 38 37 13 9
Notes: This table reports the number of elementary and middle charter schools in New York City
and their participation in the observational and lottery studies. Elementary schools include all
schools that have their main admissions lottery in grades PK - 4. Middle schools include all schools
that have their main admissions lottery in grades 5 - 8. Eligible charters are deﬁned as schools that
serve a general student population with at least one tested grade in 2009 - 2010.
29Table 2
Characteristics of Charter Schools
Elementary Schools Middle Schools
Above Below Above Below
Human Capital Median Median Median Median
Frequent Teacher Feedback 0.83 0.60 0.83 0.14
Teacher Formal Feedback 3.52 2.35 3.33 1.50
Teacher Informal Feedback 12.89 8.96 10.08 5.57
Non-Negotiables When Hiring 1.55 1.20 1.17 1.20
Teacher Tenure 3.45 3.89 3.50 4.21
Teachers Leaving Involuntarily 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.14
Total Teacher Hours 60.25 52.50 60.00 49.71
Teacher Non-Instructional Hours 2.25 2.00 5.33 2.50
Teacher Responsibilities 2.17 2.60 3.33 2.00
Max Teacher Pay 7.89 8.13 8.39 8.68
Data Driven Instruction
Data Driven Instruction 0.86 0.50 1.00 0.33
Uses Interim Assessments 1.00 0.90 0.83 1.00
Number of Interim Assessments 3.92 2.42 4.00 2.04
Number of Diﬀerentiation Strategies 4.62 3.50 4.67 4.00
Number of Teacher Reports 4.27 3.50 3.00 2.86
Data Plan in Place 0.50 0.38 0.33 0.33
Tracking Using Data 0.45 0.20 0.67 0.57
Parent Engagement
Academic Feedback 6.14 5.58 13.92 6.79
Behavior Feedback 20.67 10.60 23.00 15.25
Regular Feedback 9.32 6.34 16.00 1.46
Tutoring
High-Dosage Tutoring 0.33 0.10 0.17 0.00
Any Tutoring 0.91 0.89 1.00 0.57
Small Group Tutoring 0.60 0.50 0.17 0.25
Frequent Tutoring 0.60 0.12 0.67 0.25
Instructional Time
+25% Increase in Time 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.57
Instructional Hours 8.07 7.36 8.17 7.87
Instructional Days 190.67 183.80 191.00 187.14
Daily Time on Math 68.30 77.11 84.33 77.40
Daily Time on ELA 137.86 122.86 113.00 91.90
Culture and Expectations
High Expectations 0.58 0.10 0.50 0.43
School-wide Discipline 0.25 0.10 0.50 0.29
Schools 12 10 6 7
30Table 2
Characteristics of Charter Schools Continued
Elementary Schools Middle Schools
Above Below Above Below
Traditional Inputs Median Median Median Median
Small Classes 0.17 0.40 0.25 1.00
High Expenditure 0.44 0.33 0.67 0.60
High Teachers with MA 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.83
Low Teachers without Certiﬁcation 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.67
Lesson Plans
Blooms Taxonomy Score 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.17
Objective Standard 0.67 0.88 0.75 1.00
Number of Diﬀerentiation Strategies 0.56 0.75 0.50 0.67
Number of Checks For Understanding 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thoroughness Index 4.67 5.12 5.50 6.83
Other Controls
Wrap-around Service Index -0.32 0.39 -0.05 0.04
Teacher Selection Index 0.09 -0.37 0.55 -0.11
No Excuses 0.60 0.25 0.80 0.29
Schools 12 10 6 7
Notes: This table reports results from a survey of New York City charter schools with entry in
elementary school (PK - 4th) or middle school (5th - 8th) grades. The survey sample excludes
schools without a tested grade in 2009 - 2010.
31Table 3
Student Summary Statistics
Eligible Survey Lottery Lottery Applicants
NYC Charters Charters Charters Winners Losers Diﬀerence
Panel A. Elementary Schools (3rd - 5th Grades)
Male 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.55 0:00
White 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01  0:00
Black 0.33 0.67 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.65 0:01
Hispanic 0.39 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.32  0:02
Asian 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01  0:00
Free Lunch 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.89  0:04
Special Education 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07  0:02
LEP 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07  0:01
Years in Charter 0.06 2.19 1.91 2.49 1.83 0.91 0:68
Observations 678708 18872 8109 1986 1769 3448
Panel B. Middle Schools (5th - 8th Grades)
Male 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.51  0:01
White 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0:00
Black 0.34 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.63 0:02
Hispanic 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.33  0:02
Asian 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02  0:01
Free Lunch 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.88  0:00
Special Education 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0:01
LEP 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06  0:01
Baseline Math 0.02 -0.06 -0.18 -0.29 -0.25 -0.21  0:04
Baseline ELA 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.19 -0.15 -0.14 0:01
Years in Charter 0.05 2.38 2.16 1.84 1.19 0.60 0:29
Observations 778929 17263 6491 1545 1608 3025
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of public school students, the sample
of students in eligible charter schools, the sample of students in charter schools in the observational
study, and the sample of students in the lottery study. The sample is restricted to students in
grades 3 - 8 between 2003 - 2004 and 2009 - 2010 with at least one follow up test score. The ﬁnal
column reports coeﬃcients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if the student won
an admissions lottery on the variable indicated in each row and lottery risk sets. *** = signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
32Table 4
The Eﬀect of Attending a Charter School on Test Scores
Reduced First Lottery Survey
Form Stage 2SLS OLS OLS
Level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math 0:119 0:755 0:158 0:054 0:041
(0:029) (0:054) (0:038) (0:004) (0:003)
9706 9706 9706 666928 666928
ELA 0:056 0:755 0:074 0:050 0:036
(0:027) (0:054) (0:036) (0:003) (0:003)
9706 9706 9706 666928 666928
Math 0:064 0:403 0:159 0:051 0:029
(0:015) (0:024) (0:037) (0:004) (0:002)
11712 11712 11712 1061829 1061829
ELA 0:023 0:404 0:057 0:013 0:015
(0:014) (0:024) (0:034) (0:004) (0:002)
11712 11712 11712 1061829 1061829
Notes: This table reports reduced form, ﬁrst stage, and two-stage least squares results for the lottery
study (Columns 1 - 3) and observational estimates for the survey study (Columns 4 - 5). The lottery
sample is restricted to students in an elementary or middle school charter school lottery, excluding
students with sibling preference. All lottery speciﬁcations control for lottery risk set, race, sex, free
lunch eligibility, grade, and year. All observational speciﬁcations include match cell, race, sex, free
lunch eligibility, grade, and year. Middle school speciﬁcations also include baseline test scores. All
speciﬁcations cluster standard errors at the student level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** =
signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
33Table 5
The Correlation Between Traditional Resource Inputs
and School Eﬀectiveness
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Class Size  0:041
(0:029)
Per Pupil Expenditure 0:003
(0:028)
Teachers with No Certiﬁcation  0:043
(0:022)




R2 0.060 0.001 0.078 0.059 0.136
Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Panel B: ELA Results
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Class Size  0:027
(0:021)
Per Pupil Expenditure  0:001
(0:020)
Teachers with No Certiﬁcation  0:023
(0:018)




R2 0.117 0.071 0.112 0.158 0.204
Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey.
Each independent variable is an indicator for being above the median in that domain. The index is a
sum of the dichotomous measures standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5
percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
34Table 6
The Correlation Between Non-Traditional (i.e. “Within the School”)
Inputs and School Eﬀectiveness
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teacher Feedback 0:075
(0:021)










R2 0.199 0.196 0.090 0.262 0.169 0.470
Observations 35 20 35 35 35 35
Panel B: ELA Results
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Teacher Feedback 0:054
(0:017)










R2 0.262 0.200 0.287 0.201 0.250 0.498
Observations 35 20 35 35 35 35
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey.
Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** =
signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
35Table 7
The Partial Correlation of Each Non-Traditional Input
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teacher Feedback 0:038
(0:022)








Index 0:046 0:051 0:052 0:039 0:054
(0:012) (0:010) (0:011) (0:009) (0:010)
R2 0.471 0.479 0.470 0.482 0.494
Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Panel B: ELA Results
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Teacher Feedback 0:028
(0:015)








Index 0:031 0:035 0:031 0:033 0:035
(0:009) (0:009) (0:009) (0:011) (0:010)
R2 0.498 0.499 0.544 0.503 0.510
Observations 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey.
Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** =













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Out of Sample Test of Non-Traditional Inputs
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teacher Feedback 0:027
(0:022)








R2 0.017 0.000 0.097 0.118 0.069
Observations 56 56 49 52 56
Panel B: ELA Results
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Teacher Feedback 0:008
(0:014)








R2 0.004 0.005 0.026 0.164 0.037
Observations 56 56 49 52 56
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade with available site visit data. Regres-
sions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** = signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
39Figure 1
Lottery and Observational Estimates
! = 0.768
































































-.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Observational Estimate
ELA
Notes: This ﬁgure reports school-speciﬁc treatment estimates using the lottery and observational
designs. The lottery sample is restricted to students in an elementary or middle school charter school
lottery, excluding students with sibling preference. All lottery speciﬁcations control for lottery risk
set, race, sex, free lunch eligibility, grade, and year. All observational speciﬁcations include match
cell, race, sex, free lunch eligibility, grade, and year. Middle school speciﬁcations also include
baseline test scores.
40Appendix Table 1
Charter Schools in Survey Sample
2010 - 2011 Year Years in
Grades Opened lottery study Survey Video
Panel A: Elementary Schools (3rd - 5th Grades)
Amber Charter School K - 5 2000 2005 - 2006 Yes Yes
Bronx Academy of Promise K - 3 2008 Yes No
Bronx Charter School for Children K - 5 2004 2006 Yes Yes
Bronx Charter School for the Arts K - 6 2003 Yes Yes
Brooklyn Ascend Charter School K - 4 2008 2008 Yes Yes
Excellence Boys Charter School K - 7 2004 2003 - 2006 Yes Yes
Explore Charter School K - 8 2000 2005 - 2006 Yes Yes
Family Life Academy Charter School K - 8 2001 Yes No
Future Leaders Institute Charter School K - 5 2005 No Yes
Girls Preparatory Charter School K - 6 2005 Yes Yes
Grand Concourse Academy Charter School K - 5 2004 Yes Yes
Harbor Science and Arts Charter School 1 - 8 2002 2007 Yes Yes
Harlem Children’s Zone Promise Academy K - 5 2004 2004 - 2006 Yes Yes
Harlem Children’s Zone Promise Academy II K - 6 2005 2005 - 2006 Yes Yes
Harlem Link Charter School K - 5 2005 2005 - 2009 Yes Yes
Harlem Success Academy Charter School K - 5 2006 2006 - 2008 Yes Yes
Hyde Leadership Charter School Bronx K - 5 2009 2006 Yes Yes
Manhattan Charter School K - 5 2005 2008 Yes No
Peninsula Preparatory Academy K - 5 2004 2009 Yes Yes
Renaissance Charter School K - 5 2000 Yes Yes
Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem K - 5 1999 Yes Yes
South Bronx Classical Charter School K - 5 2006 Yes Yes
South Bronx Int. Cultures and the Arts K - 5 2005 Yes No
Panel B: Middle Schools (5th - 8th Grades)
Bronx Preparatory Charter School 5 - 8 2000 2008 - 2009 Yes Yes
Coney Island Preparatory Charter School 5 - 6 2009 2009 - 2010 Yes Yes
Democracy Preparatory Charter School 6 - 10 2006 2006 - 2009 Yes Yes
Equality Charter School 6 - 8 2009 2009 Yes Yes
Explore Charter School 6 - 8 2000 Yes Yes
Harbor Science and Arts Charter School 1 - 8 2002 2007 Yes Yes
Harlem Children’s Zone Promise Academy 6 - 8 2004 2005 - 2008 Yes Yes
Hyde Leadership Charter School Bronx 6 - 10 2009 2006 - 2007 Yes Yes
KIPP Inﬁnity 5 - 8 2005 Yes No
Opportunity Charter School 6 - 12 2004 2008 - 2009 Yes Yes
Renaissance Charter School 6 - 8 2000 Yes Yes
St. HOPE Leadership Academy 5 - 8 2008 Yes Yes
Summit Academy Charter School 6 - 7 2009 2009 Yes Yes
Notes: This table lists all New York City charter schools participating in the survey study. Elemen-
tary schools include all schools that have their main admissions lottery in grades PK - 4. Middle
schools include all schools that have their main admissions lottery in grades 5 - 8. Eligible charters
serve a general student population with at least one tested grade in 2009 - 2010.
41Appendix Table 2
The Correlation Between Traditional Resource Inputs
and School Eﬀectiveness: Lottery Estimates
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Class Size  0:142
(0:096)
Per Pupil Expenditures 0:073
(0:096)
Teachers with No Certiﬁcation  0:118
(0:082)




R2 0.106 0.032 0.085 0.020 0.088
Observations 22 22 22 22 22
Panel B: ELA Results
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Class Size  0:097
(0:094)
Per Pupil Expenditures 0:015
(0:090)
Teachers with No Certiﬁcation  0:104
(0:064)




R2 0.054 0.002 0.073 0.001 0.060
Observations 22 22 22 22 22
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey.
Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** =
signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
42Appendix Table 3
The Correlation Between Non-Traditional (i.e. “Within the School”)
Inputs and School Eﬀectiveness: Lottery Estimates
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Teacher Feedback 0:170
(0:067)
Data Driven Instruction 0:134
(0:065)








R2 0.154 0.137 0.012 0.046 0.138 0.184
Observations 22 14 22 22 22 22
Panel B: ELA Results
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Teacher Feedback 0:078
(0:050)
Data Driven Instruction 0:173
(0:046)








R2 0.037 0.344 0.018 0.014 0.058 0.088
Observations 22 14 22 22 22 22
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey.
Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** =
signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
43Appendix Table 4
The Partial Correlation of Each Non-Traditional Input:
Lottery Estimates
Panel A: Math Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teacher Feedback 0:116
(0:087)
Data Driven Instruction 0:111
(0:088)






Index 0:050 0:063 0:082 0:126 0:056
(0:029) (0:028) (0:021) (0:034) (0:050)
R2 0.196 0.201 0.184 0.246 0.188
Observations 22 22 22 22 22
Panel B: ELA Results
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Teacher Feedback 0:024
(0:056)
Data Driven Instruction 0:147
(0:056)






Index 0:051 0:027 0:050 0:102 0:042
(0:019) (0:019) (0:023) (0:032) (0:025)
R2 0.090 0.137 0.090 0.148 0.089
Observations 22 22 22 22 22
Notes: This table reports regressions of school-speciﬁc treatment eﬀects on school characteristics.
The sample includes all schools with at least one tested grade that completed the charter survey.
Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated school impact. *** =
signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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